Employee financial participation in Spain by Nieto Rojas, Patricia
  
 
 
 
 
 
 This is a postprint version of the following published document: 
 
 
 
Nieto Rojas, P. (2010): Employee financial participation in Spain. In: 
Garibaldo, F. y Telljohan, V. (eds.). The ambivalent character of 
participation. New tendencies in worker participation in Europe. 
Frankfurt: Peter Lang, pp. 355-367. 
 
 
 
 
 
© Peter Lang, 2010 
 
 
  
1 
 
EMPLOYEE FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION IN SPAIN 
 
Patricia Nieto Rojas 
Ph.D. candidate in Labor Law 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. 
patricia.nieto@uc3m.es 
 
Summary:  
I. Introduction. Financial participation of employees in the European Union.  
II. Spanish framework: objectives and development 
III. Corporate governance policy framework and financial participation  
IV. Conclusions 
V. References 
 
Abstract: 
 
Several studies have shown the link between employee ownership on the one hand, and 
HRM practices on the other (POUSTMA, E; KAARSEMAKER, E, 2006: 686). 
However, there is no strong empirical argument regarding the reasons for the 
relationship between employee ownership and voice participation in workplace decision 
making. It is expected, therefore, that firms using financial participation will also be 
found to have a range of HRM features in place, such as higher-than average training 
expenditure, comprehensive performance appraisal systems, etc (EUROFOUND, 2007: 
8), 
 
The current level of employee financial participation in Spain is one of the lowest in the 
EU-27; however the last ten years have seen new developments. The following research 
demonstrates how the regulatory framework has influenced the interaction between the 
HRM system and employee ownership due to the lack of specific legislation for the 
representation of worker-owners. This legislation, unlike that for trade unions, would 
enable employee-owners to exercise influence over decision making or gain access to 
information. 
 
Employee financial participation plays no role in collective bargaining and trade unions 
accept financial participation models only in the form of additional benefits over and 
above normal remuneration. 
 
I. Introduction. Financial participation of employees in the European Union. 
 
With the conviction that the competitiveness of European companies demands a 
framework of employment quality which promotes the creation of value for their 
workers, European administrations insist on the need to support new forms of corporate 
employee participation. In this context, COM (2002) 364, within a framework for 
employee financial participation, refers to the potential of this type of participation in 
attaining the objectives established at the Lisbon Summit, that is, to ensure that by 2010 
the European economy is “the most innovative knowledge-economy of the world.” The 
European Union (EU) also maintains that its employees’ financial participation must be 
considered as an optimal means of reaching a better distribution of wealth, taking into 
account the positive effects on the productivity and motivation of the implied workers, 
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and therefore it urges the Member States to promote its development by adopting the 
following measures: a) creation of networks that facilitate the exchange of information 
between the interested parties; b) sensitization of social interlocutors, and c) promotion 
of a favorable fiscal framework for the adoption of these formulas 
 
However, there are still significant differences in the development of these mechanisms 
among the different member states. On one hand, the countries with a long history of 
promoting these systems, especially France, have developed a complex normative that 
recognizes new forms of employee corporate participation (EUROFOUND, 2007: 10-
20). On the other hand, in Spain employee financial participation has not been a target 
for relevant legislative pronouncements in labor or in private law despite the fact that 
Article 129.2 of the Spanish Constitution rules that public administrations should 
promote different forms of employee corporate participation and facilitate employees’ 
access to productive means of ownership.  
 
The reduced legislative attention that these formulas have received in the Spanish model 
has been pointed out in all the communitarian reports. For example, a study coordinated 
by Professor E. POUSTSMA in 2001 concludes with worrisome data: 84% of the 
Spanish companies surveyed did not have any financial participation policies. Of the 
rest, only 6% had implanted a component of profit participation as opposed to 8% that 
had supported this type of ownership participation. As a recent report elaborated by the 
EUROFOUND shows, this tendency persists in Spain, whereas share ownership shows 
a considerably lower incidence – around half of all other countries (EUROFOUND, 
2007: 26), unlike what happens in Ireland and France, which show the highest degree of 
share ownership even after other variables are controlled for: the odds ratio of 
participating financially in these countries is three times higher than in the rest.  
 
Despite the above, it is true that in recent years we have observed the emergence of 
certain polices that facilitate employee financial participation in Spain’s most relevant 
companies, basically by developing benefits linked to the companies’ performance or by 
employee participation policies such as free or discounted shares, bonds that can be 
upgraded into stock option plans or warrants. The objective of this presentation is to 
analyze the reasons that determine this renewed interest, its development, and especially 
what its function is; that is, if these mechanisms can be considered exclusively new 
compensation formulas or whether, on the contrary, their appearance may respond to a 
broad objective, such as the incorporation of a new way of managing human resources, 
which is more integral and oriented to corporate social responsibility.  
 
The growing importance of human capital to guarantee corporate competitiveness has 
facilitated, in a more general context, the development of increasingly intense forms of 
cooperation between a company and its employees. Among these policies, we must talk 
about the mechanisms that financially link the employees with the company for which 
they work. Once the communitarian theses have been surpassed, the employees’ 
financial participation appears as a sort of voluntary collaboration that does not respond 
to the logic of the abandonment of the established economic system where the employee 
becomes an owner of production means, thus subverting the established order, but 
rather to criteria nearer to efficient human resources management (MERCADER, J.R., 
1996: 210).  
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Ever since 1984 when WEITZMAN presented his share economy model, it has been 
demonstrated that the implantation of financial participation policies is a measure whose 
development is recommendable for economic reasons since it can play an excellent role 
in the attainment of microeconomic objectives, basically through its incentives in the 
productivity of employees, especially in the mechanisms that link workers’ wages with 
company benefits (ROBINSON, A; WILSON, 2006: 44). We cannot ignore the fact that 
one of the main challenges companies face is the so-called “agency problem” which can 
be concisely defined as the difficulty in motivating an agent (employee) to act in the 
name of someone else (company), knowing that their retribution is going to be totally 
disconnected from the obtained results. With the aim of diminishing these negative 
effects, following the notion that if “the agents (workers) behave in agreement with the 
desire of the interested party, it is necessary for them to reach an agreement that makes 
them take some responsibility for the result of their activities and, therefore, to support a 
greater risk than if that need did not exist.” (MCCONELLL, C; BRUE, S; 
MACPHERSON, D. 2007: 211).  
 
Production changes and the overcoming of a model of industrial economy where 
egalitarian wage structures prevailed have given way to models that value the 
individual’s contribution to the organization. Today, monetary compensation is 
structured as a management tool with a strategic function; therefore, companies must 
devise policies that act as an incentive to enter or remain in a certain company. 
Historically, salary structures were designed to serve the entire organization regardless 
of each worker’s contribution to the company. But this model is no longer valid in 
today’s labor market where corporate competitiveness is directly related to the creation 
of value by employees. Egalitarian systems have been relegated to workers with less 
negotiation power who cannot agree on individualized wage policies. With the aim of 
obtaining and retaining the best employees, companies can establish two strategies in 
the design of their payroll policies (PÉREZ INFANTE, J, 2003: 70): 
 
a) To establish efficiency wages, that is, to pay higher than the market’s standard wages 
and therefore offer salaries with a rent component that surpass the minimum wage.  
 
b) To introduce variable incentives that link workers’ salaries with the companies’ 
benefits, reaching certain goals or reaching a determined level of profits. Among these 
new compensation policies we find:  
 
1. Systems linked to the attainment of corporate goals that can be granted directly, 
conditional on the attainment of positive results, or on the fulfillment of 
collective objectives (gain sharing). This last formula is calculated based on a 
group’s performance level, and the incentive is distributed among its members 
independent of their individual performance, as it is only granted when the 
group surpasses a predetermined goal. 
 
2. The other large block of compensation formulas which facilitates financial 
participation are those that allow an integration of the employees in a company’s 
capital by means of: a) distributing stock options among the company’s 
employees, which may be free or available at a reduced cost; b) granting bonds 
that can be upgraded into stock options, which can be defined as a negotiable 
value represented by a title or annotation which gives its owner the possibility of 
being a shareholder; c) conceding the option to exercise those options, which 
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can be defined as a financial agreement by which a company recognizes its 
employees’ right to buy its own stock options at a fixed cost and within a time 
frame which is normally established at the time the offer is made. 
 
The implantation of these initiatives also facilitates greater compensation flexibility as 
long as employees link part of their salaries to the results obtained when the system they 
are using is a distribution of benefits or enables cash salaries to be replaced with salaries 
in which the employees are paid with stock options or shares of the company. 
Moreover, these methods may help to mould attitudes towards the company and its 
profits; performance-related pay and reward systems, together with control over results 
and goals (measured to company profits, productivity and so on) make up a central core 
of instruments of economic control within the new managerial thinking (EDLING, C; 
SANDBERG, A., 2003: 159).  
 
II. Spanish framework. Objetives and development 
 
Once we have identified the main tendencies of employees’ economic participation, it 
should be asked what the real extent of these policies or formulas is in Spain. As already 
noted, the development of these mechanisms is still at an early stage and, accordingly, 
their presence in collective bargaining is not very generalized. However, we must point 
out that the Acuerdo Interconfederal para la Negociación Colectiva –a pact made by the 
unions and most representative chambers of commerce with the aim of defining the 
directives, recommendations, and criteria that are to be observed in collective 
bargaining negotiated in any sector or branch of activity – recommends that collective 
agreements define the compensation structure and, where appropriate, drive the 
implantation of mechanisms of financial participation. With this in mind, the definition 
of variable concepts should take into account the following: criteria of objectivity and 
clarity to be considered when implementing them; the delimitation of variable 
compensation percentages versus total compensation; the employee representatives’ 
right to access to information and to participation in the company, and the realities 
specific to each company or productive sector. 
 
This thesis is also maintained in the criteria for collective bargaining approved by the 
unions. For instance, Comisiones Obreras considers it a high priority to include clauses 
that link workers’ compensation with the results obtained, understanding that 
“companies which year after year accumulate profuse benefits must pave the way to  
return policies, where part of the benefits generated go back to the workers to increase 
their spending power.” This position contrasts with the one maintained in the criteria of 
collective negotiation approved by the principle Spanish employers’ association, CEOE, 
which makes no reference to this matter.  
 
Regardless of the programmatic declaration on the inclusion of financial participation 
formulas found in the Acuerdo Interconfederal para la Negociación Colectiva, these 
systems are still an exception in Spanish business practice. One of the reasons for this 
divergence is that the implementation of these systems is normally initiated unilaterally 
by the company and not as the result of a collective agreement. Nevertheless, some 
compensation agreements are now incorporating formulas such as the ones described 
above. Such is the case of the Group EROSKI in which a three-part employee 
participation model is anticipated: capital, results, and management. The cooperative 
tradition of this company explains the origin of this patrimonial integration. This 
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experience, implemented in 1998 and unprecedented in Spain, transfers the will of its 
employees as owners of the company to an anonymous society. On the other hand, and 
especially notable, is the DANONE agreement which includes a pact on profit 
participation to make the employees participate in the company’s direction. This is 
based on the following premise: “when wealth and prosperity are created within the 
company, it is right and desirable that the personnel who have contributed to them 
annually receive part of the generated wealth growth.”  
 
Finally, the most significant experience of employee patrimonial integration in Spanish 
companies took place when INDITEX joined the stock market, a moment in which a 
process of distribution of free shares among its employees was promoted. This release 
facilitated the integration in the shared capital of around 20,000 workers and 
represented 0.7% of the company’s capital. The only criterion used in the distribution 
was the number of years of employment with the group, so that all the employees who 
were active on December 31, 2000 and would be so four months prior to entering the 
stock market received 50 options per year served, with a maximum of 1000. In other 
companies, such as the case of OERLIKON, the right of their employees to buy stock 
options is conventionally granted after the first year that employees work in the 
company.  
 
As can be seen, all of the above experiences relate to mid-sized and large companies, 
with good labor conditions and whose human resources strategy is based on the 
integration of the employees in the companies’ actions. We must not forget that with 
this type of financial participation structure, the aim is to interest the employees in the 
company’s direction. Companies seek to motivate their employees with the same 
formulas used with their shareholders: the greater the profits a company obtains, the 
greater its employees’ compensation will be, especially when this occurs through stock 
options, which enable the creation of a longer and more solid link between the company 
and the employee, who becomes part of the corporate dynamic just like any other 
stockholder.  
 
This analysis was guided by the proposition that financial participation and other HRM 
measures have a reciprocal relationship. If employees are to accept performance-
enhancing initiatives from management, such as performance appraisals, it can be 
argued that they should receive a pay-off from any improvements in performance that 
might result. The analysis of the data on financial participation of employees in the 
European Union coordinated by EUROFOUND shows that, indeed, employee training 
and performance appraisal schemes are associated with the presence of share ownership 
schemes. This supports the notion that companies try to protect human capital 
development through the combined use of training, appraisal and share ownership 
schemes. The results also show that there is a correlation between profit sharing 
schemes and individual performance-related pay measures (EUROFOUND, 2007: 10). 
These methods could be regarded as ways of securing workers` commitment to the 
company’s overall goals, and could therefore be viewed as part of the attempt to gain 
ideological control. According to this hypothesis, schemes of financial participation 
function better where these are combined with institutions of employee participation in 
decision making and, that employee share-ownership plans (ESOPs), in particular are 
most likely to flourish in a participatory environment. 
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In the same way, these mechanisms have a valuable function in the selection of 
determined employees and are a key instrument to retain the most qualified employees. 
Companies seek to retain qualified employees in order to eliminate high turnaround 
costs, and this is one reason why the promotion of these formulas can be decisive. This 
function is very graphic in stock option plans, the exercise of which is conditional on 
the preset term to the point that an employee will not be able to leave the company if 
he/she wants to exercise his or her option.  
 
However, in Spain the real incidence of these formulas, still in the establishment and 
consolidation phase, is limited: the number of affected companies is reduced; the fact 
that employee stock option ownership is so small in big companies does not allow them 
to have a direct influence on the company’s direction; and the inexistence of an 
adequate policy for stockholding employees unlike, for instance, in France’s legal 
system, have obscured the advantages linked to these participative structures 
(ALFARO, J. 1995: 135). Following this thesis, the economic integration of employees 
has been used more for the fulfillment of other aims more related to social stability than 
to real promotion of the participation of employees in the corporate structure. Thus, 
these mechanisms have made the following possible:  
 
a) Guarantee of social peace: It has been demonstrated that companies which implement 
policies of financial participation display lower levels of social conflict and fewer 
strikes (VAQUERIZO. A, 2004: 515). 
 
b) As a management tool with the aim of making employees a more receptive group that 
will adapt to organizational changes, following the logic that if they financially 
participate in the company, they must be more flexible in terms of the changes that may 
arise (VELASCO SAN PEDRO, L, 1999: 44). 
 
c) Finally, if the formula adopted is the granting of stock options, this mechanism can 
serve to reduce a stock option excess or to “park options in friendly hands.” Employees’ 
traditional resistance to changes can be a useful tool for securing a high number of stock 
options that will not be used in mergers, public offers or other similar operations 
 
However, we cannot admit a reduccionist interpretation of the employees’ financial 
participation that unconditionally establishes the convenience or inconvenience of these 
mechanisms. These formulas must be understood in a more general evolutionary 
process of a company’s power relationships; this way, in contrast to the traditional 
conflictive tone, we must now try to promote integrative aspects for the sake of the 
corporate competitiveness that a globalized economy demands. The existence of 
opposing interests between employees and entrepreneurs is intended to be diminished. 
In the new socio-labor model, the ideas of collaboration and cooperation gain terrain 
over previous notions of conflict, antagonism, and confrontation. 
 
This new work organization, where productivity is elevated as a central value of the 
system, is a challenge for the unions, since many of these instruments are implemented 
directly by the company with no prior agreement or consultation with the employees’ 
representatives. It is true that the increase of these schemes does not suppose a 
significant displacement of the indirect participation mechanisms as long as these new 
formulas coexist, without too many difficulties, with collective mechanisms of 
employee representation. Nevertheless, the unions are in a complex situation. Their role, 
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if not completely accessory, may be reduced, as long as the strategies of employees’ 
financial participation are not a collective result but a unilateral decision of the 
company. Human resources’ homogeneity is one of the principal challenges the unions 
face now that corporate decisions are linked to a global context (BAYLOS, A. 2005: 
242).  
 
Thus, in large companies which have developed financial participation mechanisms, 
this decision has not been decided based on one specific country, nor is it the result of 
national legislation or a particular collective agreement, but rather is the corporation’s 
response to a multinational compensation strategy. Such is the case of MICROSOFT, 
whose employee shareholding participation plans have been widely studied as a 
paradigm of employee loyalty techniques. This company considers as its zone of 
influence regions that surpass national limits and, consequently, include several 
countries; this reflects the fact that the most important management decisions are 
located in the group’s direction, not in the national branches. 
 
III. Corporate governance policy framework 
 
At this point, we must evaluate to what extent these participatory initiatives respond to 
their own logic. That is, whether they are the result of a new, less hierarchic, more 
democratic concept of the company where employees financially integrate themselves 
in the company as a response to a socio-corporate responsibility policy; or whether, on 
the contrary, they merely form a new group of compensation formulas which are more 
flexible and better adapted to a company’s economic situation. The interest in corporate 
governance policy within the logic of voluntary integration of the social and 
environmental aspects of its commercial operations and their relationship with its 
interlocutors on the part of the companies has undergone significant growth in the last 
two decades. But these policies should also be seen as a way to make our societies more 
competitive and better prepared to face the challenges of globalization. With regard to 
our study, employees’ financial integration in the company for which they work, 
whether by participating in its profits or by means of stock options, appears in the 
“Green Paper - Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility”, 
COM(2001) 366, as a practice that facilitates the hiring and retention of key employees.  
 
Although the EC´s interest in CSR remains high for state intervention, there is no 
consensus over the future shaping of a mandatory law in this space. Spanish legislation 
covers many issues such as working conditions, health and safety, equality, that many 
people could consider implicit or minium CSR. In addition, the Spanish Government 
has created the State Council on Corporate Social Responsibility as a collegiate, 
advisory and consultative body at the service of the Government, of a quadripartite and 
joint nature, in charge of strengthening and promoting Corporate Social Responsibility 
policies [RD 221/2008].  
 
The objectives of the Council shall be as follows: a) to constitute a forum for debate on 
Corporate Social Responsibility between the most representative Employers’ and Trade 
Union Organisations, Public Administrations and other organisations and institutions 
with an acknowledged representative role in the field of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, in order that it may serve as a framework of reference for the 
development of Corporate Social Responsibility in Spain: b) to promote initiatives 
regarding Corporate Social Responsibility and in the context of its advisory and 
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consultative functions, to propose measures in this regard to the Government, paying 
special attention to the unique characteristics of SMEs. 
 
A considerable number of European companies include CSR-related initiatives in their 
corporate mission. The implementation and strategic integration of CSR by enterprises 
should be further improved and the role of employees, their representatives and their 
trade unions in the development and implementation of CSR practices should be further 
enhanced.  
 
Regardless financial participation can also play an important role in the creation of 
corporate value through improvements in terms of employee effectiveness, 
commitment, and flexibility. Accordingly, the internal dimension of corporate 
commitment is seen in the consideration of the employees as stakeholders whose 
financial integration not only fulfills an economic objective, but also responds to an 
ethical objective of the company with and for its employees. This concept of business 
management which integrates not only the shareholders but also applies to other 
stakeholders (clients, providers, employees) results in a strategic direction with 
dimensions that go beyond economic results and include social and environmental 
aspects, trying to balance all the interests involved in the company –as in a coalition– 
even while admitting that these interests may at times be opposed (LANDA, J. P., 2006: 
28).  
 
This pluralistic model of the company comes from the idea that it is not only the 
shareholders who support risks; employees also participate in a company’s overall 
situation and we have analyzed the possibility of introducing the stakeholder model in 
firms that promotes the development of more intense formulas for employees’ corporate 
integration, such as giving stakeholders decision-making rights. Productivity growth 
and management effectiveness demand the implementation of participation mechanisms 
for all risk takers and all who contribute specific resources for these goals.  
 
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders 
established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of 
financially sound enterprises (OECD, 2004: 21). This point of view contrasts with the 
classic theory of property rights, obviously against sharing the profit among the 
employees since, in pure business logic, it starts from the base that the social interest in 
corporations must be represented by the shareholders’ interest, and that the value 
creation must consequently be focused towards these and not towards other 
stakeholders. In adittion, in the capitalist firms irrespective of size or ownership 
structure, the formal decision-making rights lie with the owners or shareholders 
(JANSSON, E. 2005: 1). 
 
The need to create value for the shareholder requires, therefore, a calculation of the 
financial results not by their intrinsic value but by the remuneration the shareholders 
hope to receive. This option has far-reaching consequences in labor relations. Since they 
lack the power of intervention in shareholders’ decisions, employees will not be able to 
participate in matters that affect them directly. For this reason, any strategy that aims to 
facilitate greater cooperation in the company’s decision making process must start with 
its integration in the corporate structure (MORIN, M.L, 2005: 11).  
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While it is true that the financial integration of employees makes a long-term 
investment policy possible, as opposed to market investors who are focused on short-
term results, it is not so easy to affirm that employees’ financial participation is in fact 
an advancement in the recognition of mechanisms that facilitate greater cooperation of 
employees and management. The corporate motivations to articulate these formulas 
respond to diverse goals from obtaining a more cohesive group to improving 
productivity or propitiating a compensation strategy linked to the company’s real 
situation. The new needs imposed by the market and the transformations in labor 
relations systems are factors which must be considered when analyzing the evolution of 
these financial participation mechanisms. Today, companies need an ample margin of 
flexibility for their immediate adaptation to changes, and their competitiveness will 
clearly be influenced by their capacity to create value for the people who comprise 
them. In this context, the design of a compensation policy is clearly a differentiating 
corporate element. Compensation has gone from being a tool of financial return to being 
a management tool. From this perspective, new compensation formulas directed 
towards linking a productive agent with the owner of the production have appeared. 
 
Therefore, the implementation of these mechanisms fulfills two basic functions. First of 
all, it links employee wages to the results obtained, allowing a greater adjustment 
between the company’s real situation and employee compensation. Second, it allows the 
integration of the different interests existing in an organization to fortify this 
collaboration and increase its implementation. Consequently, financial participation 
should not be seen as a gift from the company. It is the employees’ financial entailment 
with their company that contributes to increased productivity, thus, the other 
shareholders also benefit from this agreement. 
 
IV. Conclusions.  
 
One conclusion we can infer from the capacity of these formulas to propitiate greater 
participation of employees in corporate management is that this power is still not 
significant in Spanish companies. These mechanisms are usually introduced as a tool of 
variable contribution which plays a major role in attracting and retaining talent, and not 
so much for these formulas’ potential to generate an attitude of employee co-
responsibility in corporate decisions. Among the reasons that may explain this 
divergence are: a) the reduced number of shares owned by employees, and b) the 
nonexistence of specific participation mechanisms to grant shareholding employees 
access to corporate organisms. The employees’ financial integration in companies does 
not respond to the logic of the established economic system by which employees 
become owners of mass productions. Its emergence responds to criteria closer to 
efficient human resource management.  
 
Another factor that explains its reduced development in Spain is the insufficient 
legislative support for these formulas. In 2002, the Socialist Parliamentary Group 
presented a law proposing to regulate employees’ right to information, counseling, and 
corporate participation; Article 10 established the right to participate in a company’s 
financial profits, materialization of which was linked to the attainment of general goals 
set in a participation agreement. However, this initiative was not approved in the end 
and has not been reintroduced in the two successive legislatures under the Socialist 
Group Government.  
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